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The Bad Mother:
Stigma, Abortion
and Surrogacy
Paula Abrams

Introduction
Surrogacy and abortion represent two facets of procreative liberty, the right to reproduce and the right to avoid
reproducing. Research on stigma associated with abortion and surrogacy illuminates how these very different
experiences carry similar stigmatic harm. Why do certain decisions about reproduction engender social support, other decisions social disapproval? Restrictions
on surrogacy and abortion derive from a common legal
paradigm — state regulation on the pregnant body —
that is rooted in traditional gender roles. Not all laws
restricting abortion and surrogacy evince gender stereotyping. Abortion and surrogacy pose complex moral
and social dilemmas. But research of stigma associated
with abortion and surrogacy suggests that gender stereotypes play a role in the creation of stigma.
This stigma reflects complex cultural disagreements
about the meaning of maternity. The debate is framed
by medical advancements that have transformed our
understanding of reproduction. Despite the fact that
modern birth control has been available for over 50
years, the separation of sexual intercourse from reproduction continues to generate social controversy.1
Advances in assisted reproductive technologies and
reproductive medicine have altered the social construct of motherhood, fracturing the cultural understanding that motherhood is biological and inevitable.2 Prior to these advances, pregnancy was the
expected outcome of sexual intercourse and motherhood was understood to begin with pregnancy.
Surrogacy and abortion disrupt traditional expectations regarding pregnancy by separating gestation from maternity. A pregnant woman who bears a
child for another or who chooses abortion embodies
the archetype of the bad mother by “abandoning” her
child.3 She transgresses the social understanding that
“respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in
the bond of love the mother has for her child.”4 Stigma
attached to these reproductive decisions reflects a legacy of gendered roles and disapproval of women who
fail to conform to social expectations of motherhood.
This article examines how stigma attached to abortion and surrogacy reveals similar patterns of gender
stereotyping. It argues that evidence of stigma is relevant to determining whether laws regulating abortion
or surrogacy are based on impermissible stereotyping. Evidence of stigma is probative of two significant
issues, whether gender stereotypes influenced legislative purpose, and the degree of harm imposed by a
regulation, for stigma may adversely impact reproductive decisions.
Paula Abrams, J.D., is the Edward Brunet Professor of Law,
Lewis & Clark Law School.
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I. Good Mother/Bad Mother
Maternity is widely understood as biological.5 Society
deems the attachment between a woman and the fetus
she is carrying as innate and genetically ordained,
despite evidence to the contrary.6 Conception is
assumed to begin a process that inevitably leads to gestation and nurturance; the social identity of women
has been shaped by the expectation that women are
“natural” nurturers.7 To the extent both abortion and
surrogacy suggest that maternal bonds are a function
of choice, they are at odds with this assumption.8 Surrogacy and abortion challenge the socially constructed
understanding of maternity, separating conception

mother, by contrast, acts in ways that reject the inevitability of maternal bonds.16 Thus a woman who terminates a pregnancy or becomes a surrogate is by definition a bad mother. The bad mother manifests two
similar moral failings common to perceptions of abortion and surrogacy. First, by rejecting her maternal
role she abandons her child. Second, a bad mother is
one who puts personal concerns before motherhood.17
Social movements opposing surrogacy and abortion share overlapping identities and narratives. Surrogacy emerged as a contentious issue in conjunction with the media frenzy surrounding the Baby M
case in 1986. The visibility of the “pro-life” movement

This article examines how stigma attached to abortion and surrogacy
reveals similar patterns of gender stereotyping. It argues that evidence
of stigma is relevant to determining whether laws regulating abortion
or surrogacy are based on impermissible stereotyping. Evidence of stigma
is probative of two significant issues, whether gender stereotypes influenced
legislative purpose, and the degree of harm imposed by a regulation,
for stigma may adversely impact reproductive decisions.
and pregnancy from parenting, and disrupting the
unity of reproductive work.9 Social changes that challenge cultural norms are likely to be met with resistance and dissonance; stigma is one manifestation of
the social dissonance surrounding gender roles.10
Social perceptions of maternity are shaped in part
by pronatalist values, which are foundational to social
organization and religion.11 The state historically has
asserted its interest in assuring healthy offspring;
women bear the primary responsibility for raising and
socializing each new generation of citizens.12 Thus,
private decisions about reproduction are drawn into
the public arena. The social value placed on fertility is
pervasive across gender, age, race, religious, and class
distinctions.13 These norms are exceedingly resistant
to change.14
The controversies over abortion and surrogacy
evoke two archetypes — the good mother and the bad
mother. Popular culture frames these archetypes in
various ways, lionizing the “supermom” and demonizing women who delay or reject childbearing for
personal or professional reasons.15 The good mother
embraces her maternal role, accepting the social link
between conception, gestation, and maternal bonds.
She is self-sacrificing, putting the demands of her
maternal role before other personal choices. The bad
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increased during this same period.18 The coalition of
social conservatives and religious groups that opposed
surrogacy also has played a significant role in opposing legal abortion.19 Unlike abortion, controversy over
surrogacy has been episodic, but moral disgust has
been a prevalent theme invoked by opponents of both
practices.20
Public discourse about abortion and surrogacy
tracks the extent to which maternal identity issues
dominate. Negative political framings of abortion and
surrogacy rely on the bad mother archetype, drawing on embedded social taboos, such as identifying
abortion with murder. Pro-life social movements
have effectively connected abortion to broader social
themes of family values, emphasizing the significance
of traditional maternal roles to family stability.21 Surrogacy is defined as baby selling; the surrogate is
portrayed as a breeder for hire.22 The moral disgust
frequently attached to surrogacy extends beyond
objections concerned with the potential for exploitation of economic disparities.23 Surrogacy and abortion
engender dissonance that society may resolve by labeling women who select abortion or surrogacy within
the familiar construct of the bad mother. If we examine the effects of this social censure on women who
choose abortion or decide to become a surrogate, the

journal of law, medicine & ethics

Electronic copy
copy available
Electronic
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2688817
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2688817

Abrams

links emerge between social disapproval, stigma, and
gender stereotyping.

II. Stigma and Stereotyping
Influential sociologist Erving Goffman describes
stigma as an “attribute that is deeply discrediting,”
that reduces the bearer “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.”24 Most researchers
agree that stigma (1) concerns an attribute that marks
an individual as different or “other” and (2) is socially
constructed.25 Stigma is particularly associated with
identity norms and deviations from group identity
may give rise to stigma.26

are likely to face harassment from clinic protests.34
Economic disparities play a large role in perceptions
of surrogacy as well.35 The Baby M case embodied the
stereotypes associated with surrogacy – the wealthy,
educated, white intended parents contracting with
the socially and economically disadvantaged surrogate. Negative public attitudes toward surrogacy are
shaped in part by the view that surrogates are desperately poor women forced to sell their bodies or their
babies, despite the fact that surrogates in the United
States typically are working-class women. 36
Link and Phelan argue that certain differentiations
carry substantial social power, particularly distinc-

When reproductive decisions are stigmatized, both the women who make
these decisions and the procedures become marginalized. Marginalization
leads to further stigma and isolation that may encourage additional legal
restrictions; stigma thus becomes normalized. If we examine public attitudes
toward surrogacy and abortion and the experiences of women who become
surrogates or terminate a pregnancy, common patterns emerge. First, public
attitudes toward these decisions evince similar demarcations of moral approval
and disapproval. Second, the perceptions and experiences of stigma that attach
to surrogacy and abortion reveal shared themes reflecting gender stereotyping.
Stigma may be experienced in several ways. Internalized stigma occurs when the individual accepts
and incorporates a negative cultural judgment as part
of her identity.27 Stigma also may be “felt” when an
individual perceives negative attitudes from others.28
Finally, “enacted” stigma occurs when the individual
encounters prejudice or discrimination.29 Individuals
who experience stigma may suffer psychological harm
or chronic physiological stress responses.30
Not all forms of differentiation generate stigma,
nor do negative public attitudes alone create stigma.
Researchers Bruce Link and Jo Phelan theorize that
stigma occurs when a number of interrelated components converge; the dominant culture acts to label and
stereotype undesirable behavior or characteristics and
these actions lead to isolation and status loss or discrimination for those identified as “other.” 31
Social inequalities contribute to the creation and
experience of stigma.32 Economic disparities particularly influence public perceptions of abortion and surrogacy. Restrictions on access to abortion are especially burdensome to low-income women who rely
on abortion clinics.33 They are apt to encounter challenges in arranging time off from work and family and

tions based on race and gender.37 Stereotyping based
on these traits may be automatic and preconscious.38
Abortion and surrogacy, experienced only by women,
are particularly susceptible to gender-based stigma.39
“Bad mother” stigma is constructed through a multifaceted framework of messages and experiences that
include the beliefs of the individual and her interactions with friends, family, the community, and society.40 It labels women who seek abortions as “promiscuous, sinful, selfish, dirty, irresponsible, heartless
or murderous.”41 Likewise, the surrogate is deemed a
coldhearted baby-seller or a fool.42 Women who experience stigma learn these negative stereotypes and frequently internalize poor self-judgments.43
When reproductive decisions are stigmatized, both
the women who make these decisions and the procedures become marginalized. Marginalization leads to
further stigma and isolation that may encourage additional legal restrictions; stigma thus becomes normalized.44 If we examine public attitudes toward surrogacy
and abortion and the experiences of women who become
surrogates or terminate a pregnancy, common patterns
emerge. First, public attitudes toward these decisions
evince similar demarcations of moral approval and
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disapproval. Second, the perceptions and experiences
of stigma that attach to surrogacy and abortion reveal
shared themes reflecting gender stereotyping.

III. Surrogacy and Stigma
Discourse surrounding surrogacy often reflects the
good mother/bad mother binary. On one hand, surrogacy is extolled as a reproductive decision that allows
an otherwise infertile couple to have a child with a
genetic connection to one or both of the intended parents.45 In contrast, surrogacy is decried as exploitation
of a woman’s body, as classist and sexist, and the marketing of babies.46 Surrogacy divides feminists; some
argue surrogacy recognizes a woman’s moral agency,
others condemn surrogacy for reinforcing the association of woman with womb.47 These widely divergent
analyses address a common normative question – how
to distinguish between the social and biological attributes of maternity. This question informs the analysis
of surrogacy and stigma.
Surrogacy may involve one of two types of biological arrangements. Traditional surrogacy relies on artificial insemination of the surrogate’s eggs with the
intended father’s sperm. Thus, the surrogate is the
genetic mother.48 The second form of surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, involves the implantation in the
surrogate of an embryo that contains the sperm and
egg of the intended parents, or their donors. The gestational surrogate carries no genetic connection to the
baby.49 Gestational surrogacy is now the preferred and
dominant approach, with 95% of surrogacy contracts
based on IVF.50 Its dominance is due, at least in part,
to the perceived moral differences between traditional
and gestational surrogacy, discussed, below.51 Strong
preferences of parents to have a child with a genetic
connection to one or both of the parents provide some
insight into why a woman who terminates a pregnancy may be stigmatized.52 Similarly, research suggests that the significance attached to genetic relatedness explains why genetic surrogates are perceived
less favorably than gestational surrogates.53
An early and influential assessment of surrogacy,
the British Warnock Report published in 1984, offers
harsh moral criticism of surrogacy: “To deliberately
become pregnant with the intention of giving up the
child distorts the relationship between mother and
child.”54 The report explains that an arrangement
where the woman who deliberately becomes pregnant with the intention of giving up the child at birth
is the “wrong way” to approach pregnancy.55 It also
describes significant social objections to surrogacy
for undermining the value of the marital relationship.
The Warnock Report expresses no doubt that courts
faced with surrogacy disputes should find the arrange182

ment void as against public policy.56 It assumes that
the best interests of the child lie with the surrogate
and recommends that the woman who gives birth be
considered the legal mother for all purposes, even in
a gestational surrogacy arrangement. 57 The report
concludes that surrogacy for “convenience” was “morally unacceptable,” and questionable in “compelling”
medical circumstances because it is exploitive to treat
other humans as a means to one’s own ends.58 Britain
embraced this moral critique by banning commercial
surrogacy arrangements.59
The Baby M case had a significant impact on the
public perception of surrogacy in America. 60 The
controversy surrounding Baby M, which involved a
traditional surrogacy agreement, produced a negative framing of surrogacy, depicting it as baby selling
and exploitive of low-income women. The New Jersey
Supreme Court’s repeated descriptions of surrogacy
as “baby-bartering” or “baby-buying” and “selling”
became part of the public discourse about surrogacy.61
The case led to a flurry of legislative action throughout
the states seeking to ban surrogacy as against public
policy.62 The moral revulsion that widely greeted Baby
M may, in part, be a reflection of the discomfort associated with new reproductive technologies. But the
tenor of the debate, particularly the focus on the moral
assessment of the women involved, suggests the case
challenged traditional norms of maternity. The narrative generated by Baby M insisted that motherhood
was the inescapable consequence of pregnancy. Surrogates could not be expected to negate this biological
identity; they were destined to regret their decision
and thus were incapable of informed consent.
Public opposition to surrogacy coalesced after the
Baby M case.63 Decades later, surrogacy is still considered the least acceptable way to have a child.64 Only a
minority of states directly regulates surrogacy; most
jurisdictions resolve disputes through contract and
family law principles, leaving the decision to enter into
a surrogacy arrangement a risky legal undertaking.65
One recent study of British women’s attitudes suggests that stigma is widely associated with surrogacy.66
This data is consistent with results in the United States
and Canada.67 Surrogates widely report experience of
stigma.68 Stigma may impact personal relationships:
some surrogates report significant lack of social support from partners and families, particularly at two
critical and symbolic stages of the pregnancy: early
in the pregnancy when the success of the pregnancy
is established and post-delivery when the surrogate
relinquishes the baby.69 A 2005 survey of research on
the psychological and social aspects of surrogacy in the
United States and Great Britain reported that while
husbands and partners were generally supportive,
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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more than half of the surrogates surveyed experienced
increased conflict in their extended family relationships as a result of their decision to become a surrogate; 40% reported loss of a significant relationship.70
Religion appears to be a relevant factor, in surrogacy as with abortion, with those who identify as religious less inclined to find these practices acceptable.71
The Catholic Church opposes reproductive technologies, including surrogacy.72 A brief filed in the Baby M
case by the New Jersey Catholic Conference, describes
surrogacy this way: “In surrogacy, a child is conceived
precisely in order to be abandoned to others…”73 This
statement gets to the heart of the moral disapproval of
surrogacy. Not all actions that result in relinquishing
a child are perceived as objectionable. Adoption tends
to be perceived as a morally appropriate response to
untenable circumstances, presumably with the best
interest of the child the foremost concern. In that
sense the abandonment is “excused.” Surrogacy by
contrast is labeled offensive because it involves the
intention both to conceive and abandon. This purposeful bypass, not of conception or gestation, but of
motherhood, is at odds with social norms linking gestation to maternal bonding.
Surrogates and surrogacy programs take measures
to reduce stigma, characterizing surrogacy in terms
that are consistent with social expectations of motherhood and reproduction. Financial remuneration is
de-emphasized; compensation in fact may be intentionally low.74 Few surrogates, particularly gestational
surrogates, regret their decisions; they typically view
their role as participating in the “gift of life.”75 The
casting of surrogacy as the gift of a child rather than a
business transaction brings the practice more in line
with traditional views of self-sacrificing mothers. This
emphasis on altruism over remuneration has been
critical to legislative recognition of noncommercial
surrogacy.76 The “gift of life” cannot be sold, but the
law may recognize a woman’s selfless desire to help a
childless couple.77 Altruism is deemed incompatible
with remuneration; this dichotomy allows commercial surrogacy to be condemned as the prostitution of
maternity.78 The moral disgust associated with commercial surrogacy correlates to social disapproval of
abortion for economic reasons; both create dissonance
with the model of altruistic maternity. Popular culture
reinforces stereotypes of commercial surrogates as
greedy, uneducated, and dishonest.79
The shift to gestational surrogacy has engendered a
change in the social discourse, and, to some extent, the
stigma associated with surrogacy. Surrogates are now
described as “gestational carriers” rather than mothers.80 The altered social framing has generated greater
public acceptance of gestational surrogacy.81 This

development suggests that the constructed meaning
of maternity is grounded in the correlation between
genetic and maternal identity. The pregnancy per se is
not the source of the maternal obligation; the stigma
of abandonment attaches with genetic relation. The
absence of genetic relationship allows gestational surrogacy to more easily be characterized as a medical
response to infertility.
The divergent framing of traditional surrogacy and
gestational surrogacy expresses the relative moral
comfort culture attaches to one practice and not the
other. Gestational surrogacy does not threaten the
genetic-based theory of maternity to the same extent
as traditional surrogacy; the traditional surrogate and
the woman who chooses abortion are stigmatized for
challenging the inevitability of genetic attachment.82
Despite this distinction, gestational surrogacy is not
free of gendered stigma; common law presumed the
birth mother was the legal mother, and the maxim
mater est quam gestation demonstrate (by gestation
the mother is demonstrated) remains a common legal
basis for establishing maternity.83 Further, the biochemical and hormonal relationship that nurtures the
fetus during pregnancy may satisfy social and legal
definitions of maternity.84

IV. Abortion and Stigma
If the bad mother is defined primarily as a woman who
abandons her genetic relation, the woman who terminates a pregnancy is likely to encounter stigma. Unlike
the planned pregnancies of surrogacy, most abortions
occur as the result of unintended pregnancies.85 While
the intent to conceive may not be present, the decision to terminate a pregnancy may be perceived as the
ultimate abandonment of the life in being, a rejection
of maternity and of the “essential nature” of woman.86
Negative social framing of abortion frequently reflects
strong moral disapproval.87 This disapproval, influenced in part by the lack of public awareness about the
commonness of abortion, highly polarized political
discourse, and public ambivalence about acceptable
circumstances for abortion, can contribute to stigma
and the experience of isolation and social denigration
associated with stigma.88
Abortion stigma has deep historical roots in negative social attitudes toward women who decline
maternity; abortion often was associated with out-ofwedlock sex, promiscuity, and prostitution.89 Women
who terminated pregnancies typically were depicted
as impoverished and desperate.90 By the late 19th century, abortion became part of a larger cultural debate;
concerns that white, middle class women were rejecting their “roles” as child bearers and raisers led to
a nationwide movement to criminalize abortion. 91
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Women who supported abortion were berated as frivolous and self-indulgent.92 Pre-Roe, the procedure was
identified with the unsafe reality of “back alley” abortions.93 The post-Roe political backlash against abortion demonstrates how stigma can be used to discredit
legally protected conduct.94
Public support of abortion has remained generally
consistent since Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973.95
A majority of Americans favor the legality of abortion, although that majority has decreased in recent
years.96 Approval deviates sharply however when the
reasons for the abortion are considered.97 Abortion
is widely accepted as a response to significant health
risks, rape, or serious fetal anomalies but acceptance drops below 50% when abortion is chosen for
reasons of social, economic or personal hardship. 98
Public opposition to abortion in the absence of rape
or medical risk has increased since 1992 when the
Supreme Court opened the door to greater regulation
of abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,99 and rekindled a high profile
national debate.100
These demarcations in approval are consistent with
the good mother/bad mother binary. Abortion is more
acceptable to many when the woman is perceived as a
victim of circumstances beyond her control, whether
the acts of another or medical happenstance. The
woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy for
personal or economic reasons is less deserving of
respect because she is rejecting motherhood for selfish
reasons. The woman who chooses abortion in order
to better provide for children she already has receives
little sympathy.
Abortion stigma was common during the pre-Roe
era of criminalized abortion.101 Current data showing high rates of underreporting of abortions, active
concealment, and fear of social rejection suggests that
legalization has not eliminated the stigma.102 Multiple
studies conclude most women experience abortion as
a stigmatizing event.103 Socio-economic factors play a
significant role in mediating abortion stigma including racial and ethnic identity, economic status, geography, and religion.104 As with surrogacy, stigma is most
commonly experienced as external disapproval.105
A recent study of women who terminated pregnancies concludes that 67% perceived or experienced
disapproval from others, including friends and family.106 Abortion stigma derives from social disapproval
as well; in one study women identified sources of
stigma from how society “discusses abortion” or “talks
about women who have had an abortion.”107 Negative
female stereotypes influence a woman’s experience
of stigma; respondents expected others to perceive
them as immoral or sinful, a “slut” or a bad mother.108
184

As one woman explains, “[Y]ou’re supposed to feel
totally ashamed…and you’re supposed to feel like you
murdered someone and you’re supposed to punish
yourself.”109
Abortion stigma is considered “concealable”; the
stigmatizing trait is visible to others only upon disclosure.110 A woman who terminates a pregnancy must
decide whether and how to disclose her experience
111 Secretive behavior, such as a desire to conceal the
abortion or allow only selective disclosure, is a common response to real or perceived stigma.112 Stigma
can contribute to delays in scheduling the procedure,
increasing the risk of medical or legal complications.113
Stigma, and the desire to maintain secrecy, may also
influence women to choose unsafe procedures, including self-induction or the use of untrained personnel.114
Abortion stigma may be experienced as episodic or
intermittent, often arising during events or experience
where there is an option for disclosure.115 The psychological consequences of abortion stigma vary, depending on the relationship of the stigma to self-identity.116
Stigma and concealment are positively associated
with psychological distress following first-trimester
abortion in the United States.117 Psychological repercussions of stigma may be “profound.”118 Social psychologist Brenda Major writes, “Women who come to
internalize stigma associated with abortion (e.g., who
see themselves as tainted, flawed, or morally deficient)
are likely to be particularly vulnerable to later psychological distress.”119
Abortion stigma is normalized through a “prevalence paradox.120 Most women conceal their abortions,
fearing stigma and lack of support.121 Concealment
creates a false perception that abortion is uncommon.122 This misperception transforms into a social
norm that labels abortion, and the women who have
them, as deviant, furthering a cycle of secrecy and
stigma.123 Secrecy carries multiple risks: women who
conceal abortions report insomnia, panic attacks, and
anxiety.124
Like regulation of surrogacy, laws restricting abortion reflect a profound social disquiet about the
separation of sex from procreation and women from
motherhood. The woman who terminates a pregnancy
is stigmatized for the ultimate, irrevocable “abandonment” of the child.
The surrogate or the woman who has an abortion
may experience stigma differently depending on her
personal circumstances and on the type of stigma she
encounters. Because abortion is a concealable act, the
stigma experienced is more likely to be felt or perceived than enacted. The surrogate, who cannot conceal the fact of pregnancy, is thus more likely to face
enacted stigma. She may choose to manage stigma by
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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concealing the circumstances of her pregnancy from
all but family and close friends. Psychological stress
relating to disclosure and concealment thus may be
present with both abortion and surrogacy.

V. Gender Stereotypes in the Regulation
of Abortion and Surrogacy
The socio-legal arguments against abortion and surrogacy bear notable similarities. Decisions that challenge the social construction of maternity are considered unreliable or immoral, in large part because
of traditional stereotypes that deny women moral
agency. Laws regulating abortion and surrogacy often
reinforce these stigmatizing stereotypes
A. Distrust of Judgment
Laws that question the moral agency of women perpetuate stereotypes that women lack the capacity for
rational decision-making.125 The widely held perception that women frequently decide to terminate a
pregnancy or use a surrogate for purposes of reproductive “convenience” is one visible example of how
culture may devalue women’s judgment.126
Informed consent, a capacity credited to adults
from common law, is suspect when a woman decides
to become a surrogate or terminate a pregnancy.127
The debate over whether informed consent is possible
underlies the legal and ethical treatment of abortion
and surrogacy. The assumption in both circumstances
is that a rational woman would not voluntarily disrupt
the connection between pregnancy and maternity. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded regarding
informed consent by the surrogate in the Baby M case,
“[Q]uite clearly any decision prior to the baby’s birth
is, in the most important sense, uninformed.”128 The
court assumes the inevitability of the maternal bond,
presuming that the uniqueness of gestation results in
a type of diminished capacity to make decisions concerning the pregnancy. Baby M may not fully reflect
current case law; subsequent decisions are less dismissive of the surrogate’s authority but many courts still
remain reluctant to give full recognition to the surrogate’s consent, including one court that rejected an
intent-based analysis because it relies on the “whims”
of personal agreement.129 The pre-Roe laws allowing abortion only when the woman’s life or health
was endangered denied women moral authority. In
modern abortion legislation, this distrust emerges
in biased informed consent laws and laws mandating waiting periods.130 Casey describes the informed
consent requirement at issue as a legitimate attempt
“to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision,” so that she will not “discover
later, with devastating psychological consequences,

that her decision was not fully informed.”131 Casey also
approves a 24-hour waiting period, and a gendered
stereotype, with this language: “[t]he idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if
they follow some period of reflection does not strike us
as unreasonable….”132
These cases treat a woman’s decision to abort or
become a surrogate with gendered skepticism; a
woman may be deemed capable of informed consent
to all other major medical procedures but her decision
not to become a mother justifies state intervention.
B. Expectation of Regret
A woman who cannot be trusted to make a moral and
rational decision is likely to experience regret once she
learns the “truth.” The decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart,
upholding the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,
embraces the theory of regret when it opines, “While
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,
it seems unexceptional to conclude some women come
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained… Severe depression and loss of
esteem can follow.”133 The expectation of regret derives
from the same presumptions that attach stigma to
abortion and surrogacy; (1) the biological fact of pregnancy ordains motherhood, and (2) it is unnatural
for a mother to give up a child.134 This supposition
may lead to laws that question a woman’s decision or
shift authority from the woman to the government.135
Expectation of regret may lead to the imposition of
waiting periods, with surrogacy a post-birth limbo
when the surrogate can change her mind, with abortion, a pre-procedure state-mandated reflection.136
Laws that deny women the capacity to give informed
consent and anticipate profound female regret reflect
a set of stereotypes that presumes the state has a role
in protecting women from the consequences of their
decisions.
C. Protection of Women
The woman protective rationale supposes that the
decision not to become a mother is the result of poor
judgment or duress. The expectation of emotional
harm is tied, with abortion, to thoroughly discredited data concerning the existence of “post-abortion
distress syndrome.”137 With surrogacy, the distraught
images of the Baby M surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead, widely published in the media, convinced an
entire generation of lawmakers and the public of the
need to protect women from becoming surrogates.
The woman protective strategy is a familiar and still
prevalent approach to controlling women’s reproduction. By assuming that maternity is the ordained and
desirable consequence of pregnancy, the state shoul-
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ders the role of protecting the woman from the harmful consequences of her decision. Carhart, describing
the abortion decision as one “fraught with emotional
consequences,” concludes, “The State has an interest
in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.”138 The
report of an abortion task force in South Dakota concluded the state should limit abortion for the protection of the woman because“[it] is so far outside the
normal conduct of a mother to implicate herself in the
killing of her own child.”139 The state’s interference in
reproductive decisions is described as protecting the
“fundamental right [of a mother to have a] relationship with her child.”140 Similarly, one of the primary
arguments against surrogacy is the assumption that
the arrangement exploits surrogates. In one case, a
Michigan appeals court rejected a constitutional “right
to procreate” challenge to the state’s surrogacy law,
concluding that government intrusion into private
procreative choices was warranted because the state
has a compelling interest in preventing the exploitation of women.141

VI. Stigma and the Court
Stigma is a social construct; thus the question of the
interplay between stigma and law necessarily implicates the broader question of the relationship between
law and culture. Although that topic is beyond the
scope of this paper, a few observations are useful. Law
may mediate stigma in a variety of ways. Law may
reinforce the social construction of stigma by converting moral disapproval into public policy through
criminalization. Outside the criminal law, legal standards that differentiate individuals may reinforce stereotypes. Laws also may serve an expressive function,
sending messages about behavior, identity, and moral
value that reinforce stigma.142 Conversely, stigmatizing laws that reflect discrimination or animus against
certain minority groups may be evidence of constitutional harm.
The Supreme Court has considered the role of stigma
in cases involving racial discrimination, criminal convictions, government employment, paternity determinations, and involuntary commitments.143 Evidence of
stigma may be relevant to determining constitutional
harm under both the due process and equal protection
clauses.144 State reinforcement of negative stereotypes
is particularly relevant to anti-subordination concerns
under equal protection.145 Several landmark cases
focus on the harm caused by state-generated stigma.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Kennedy, expressed concern about the stigma
created by a law that criminalized homosexual sodomy.146 The Court observed how moral disapproval
embodied in law contributes to stigma and discrimi186

nation: “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres.”147 Concluding that adult, consenting homosexuals have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in intimate relationships, the Court found that
laws criminalizing same sex sodomy generate stigma
irrespective of whether the laws are enforced: “[i]f
protected conduct is made criminal and the law which
does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.”148
The decision in U.S. v. Windsor149 highlights how
stigmatic harm may result from civil laws that express
moral disapproval of protected constitutional interests. The Court, in an opinion once again written by
Justice Kennedy, finds that Section 3 of the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is an unconstitutional deprivation of equality. The Court concludes
that DOMA stigmatizes homosexuals through moral
disapproval and animus: “[t]he avowed purpose and
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose
a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by
the unquestioned authority of the States.”150 This “differentiation,” characteristic of stigma, demeans those
“whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects.”151 The Court finds that the “principal purpose
and the necessary effect” of DOMA are to “demean,”
“disparage,” and “injure” individuals who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.152
The Court’s description of stigma in Windsor
reflects the pattern of disapproval, differentiation, and
loss of status identified by Link and Phelan. Windsor articulates the relationship between moral disapproval, stigma, and constitutional harm. Carhart, in
contrast, serves as an example of how judicial opinions can reinforce stereotypes and stigma. Carhart
relies on stigmatizing language, describing physicians
as “abortionists,” fetal life as a “child,” and an abortion
as a “killing.”153 The Court’s assumption, without “reliable data,” that women may regret a decision to terminate a pregnancy relies on the same use of stereotyping that Windsor rejects.154 Unlike Lawrence and
Windsor and, indeed, Casey, Carhart accepts moral
disapproval as a basis for regulation of abortion.155
The Court has also addressed the relationship
between stigma and negative stereotyping. The decision in Brown v. Board of Education156 relies substantially on the Court’s conclusion that racially segregated schools stigmatized black children.157 Other
cases recognize that stigma may have a “very significant impact on the individual,” including personal
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and social harm.158 The Court at times has criticized
affirmative action laws for stigmatizing individuals
through stereotyping.159
Laws that perpetuate negative stereotypes are a
central concern in the Court’s analysis of gender discrimination.160 In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources

socially stigmatized on moral and religious grounds
for many years; not infrequently, conservative opponents of abortion condemn surrogacy because it relies
on birth outside the marriage relationship. The bad
mother stigma identified with abortion and surrogacy reveals the prevalence and durability of gendered

The role of law in the generation of stigma is complex, but in matters
of reproductive decisions, the risk is high that restrictions imposed
on women who terminate a pregnancy or become surrogates reflect gendered
stereotypes of motherhood. That risk is particularly problematic given the
constitutional significance of reproductive decision making. The solution in
part is to assure that the relationship between stigma and gender stereotyping
informs judicial consideration of laws regulating abortion and surrogacy.
Evidence of stigma is probative both of how gender stereotypes may influence
legislative purpose and assessment of the harm imposed by a regulation,
for stigma may impact reproductive decisions and behavior.
v. Hibbs,161 the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the mandatory leave provision of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, cites congressional findings
of widespread employment discrimination against
women based on “pervasive presumptions that women
are mothers first.”162 Hibbs recognizes that laws regulating pregnancy are particularly susceptible to stereotyping.163 Casey acknowledges deeply embedded stereotypes associated with maternity when it concludes,
“[h]er suffering is too intimate and personal for the
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of
the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture.”164
These cases recognize the relationship between
stereotyping and stigma. When the state generates
stigma or enforces social stigma, it participates in creating a pariah group that is likely to suffer loss of status or discrimination.

VII. Stigma and Laws Regulating Abortion
and Surrogacy
Stigma is a particularly pervasive mechanism for
regulating sexual conduct and reproduction.165 Reproduction is not solely a private matter; state intrusion
into reproductive decisions has a long history and
derives from public concerns about population, protection of the family unit, and morality. The cultural
shame associated with infertility and unwed motherhood has deep roots and continuing influence on public attitudes towards reproduction. Abortion has been

stereotypes. Controversies surrounding abortion and
surrogacy serve as highly visible platforms for social
debate about the roles of women.
Law serves as one medium for that dispute; in matters of sexual conduct and reproduction, law often
serves to control morality through criminalization and
stigma. The increasing separation and marginalization of abortion from other medical and reproductive
health procedures reflect the process of stigmatization
described by Link and Phelan. These laws designate
women who choose abortion as “other.” Gender stereotypes underlie abortion restrictions that contain
exceptions for rape, incest, or serious medical risks for
the woman.166 These exceptions belie the state’s claim
that protection of prenatal life must always prevail.
This good abortion/bad abortion binary, like the good
mother/bad mother duality, reflects social judgment
about when a woman may be “excused” from fulfilling
the maternal role.167 Similarly, laws that ban surrogacy
or refuse to enforce surrogacy agreements directly
stigmatize and also send powerful social messages
that surrogacy is “bad” and the surrogate, the most
visible manifestation of the arrangement, is aberrant.
The role of law in the generation of stigma is complex, but in matters of reproductive decisions, the risk
is high that restrictions imposed on women who terminate a pregnancy or become surrogates reflect gendered stereotypes of motherhood. That risk is particularly problematic given the constitutional significance
of reproductive decision making. The solution in part
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is to assure that the relationship between stigma and
gender stereotyping informs judicial consideration of
laws regulating abortion and surrogacy. Evidence of
stigma is probative both of how gender stereotypes
may influence legislative purpose and assessment of
the harm imposed by a regulation, for stigma may
impact reproductive decisions and behavior. 168

VIII. Conclusion
The harm of stigma to an individual is multi-faceted;
physical and psychological stress is likely and those
who internalize stigma suffer negative self-images.
But regulating reproductive decisions through stigma
harms not just the individual but also society. The state
should not be a participant in the process of shaming
women for their reproductive decisions; such actions
deny women moral agency. Law instead should be a
means for contesting stigma associated with gendered
stereotypes, particularly those stereotypes that undermine reproductive decision making. Martha Nussbaum, in her analysis of the role of shame and disgust
in the law, rejects the use of public laws to stigmatize
individuals, “for the state to participate in this humiliation…is profoundly subversive of the ideas of equality
and dignity on which a liberal society is based.”169
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